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WIGGINS v. STATE: RECEIVING A FAIR TRIAL
UNDER THE SPECTER OF AIDS
INTRODUCTION
The fourteenth amendment protects from state infringement1 the fun-
damental right to a fair and impartial trial in criminal prosecutions?
In order to convict a criminal defendant, the probative evidence must per-
suade the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant com-
mitted the offense? Therefore, the administration of a fair trial necessarily
requires that only properly admitted evidence influence the fact-finder
in the rendition of its judgment.4 One resource designed to achieve this
objective? is the trial judge's wide discretion over courtroom conduct Un-
fortunately, the occasion may occur when the trial judge incorrectly rules
regarding a disputed courtroom practice during the criminal trial7 If the
judge makes a mistake, and the incorrect ruling touches upon a "substan-
tial right" afforded defendants, the error may plague the trial to such
an extent that, upon review, the appellate court must deem the error
harmfulP
' See notes 34 & 35 infra and accompanying text. The sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution provides in pertinent part that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed.' U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
2 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976).
' In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
' Id. at 364. In order to establish a valid jury conviction, the jury must have been persuaded
by probative evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense.
' In United States v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610, 615 (4th Cir. 1970), the court stated: "The judge
presiding at the trial, the jurors, courtroom personnel and spectators are entitled to security in the
performance of their functions or in observing the trial. The members of the public out of the court-
room are entitled to security in the pursuit of their daily activities. The public also has an interest
in the expeditious trial of persons accused of crime, and an interest in preventing the guilty from
being at large and committing other offenses. Thus in appropriate circumstances, the accused's right
to the indicia of innocence before the jury must bow to the competing rights of participants in the
courtroom and society at large."
6 Bartholomey v. State, 260 Md. 504, 530, 273 A.2d 164, 177-178 (1971) expounds the general
rule in Maryland that "the trial judge has a wide discretion in the conduct of a trial and that the
exercise of his discretion will not be disturbed unless it has been clearly abused." See also Plank
v. Summers, 203 Md. 552, 554-55, 102 A.2d 262, 263 (1954).
' See generally Wiggins v. State, 315 Md. 232, 554 A.2d 356 (1989).
' In Chapman v. California 386 U.S. 18, 22-24 (1967), the Court stated that on the other hand,
some constitutional errors "are so unimportant and insignificant" that they may, without violating
Constitutional protections, be deemed harmless. In order for these "insignificant" errors to be deemed
harmless, the appellate court must be certain that they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In United States v. Nicholson, 846 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1988), the court suggested that a balancing
test may be the proper guide for the trial judge, whereby the judge weighs the conflicting interests
of providing a fair trial and of ensuring courtroom safety.
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Wiggins v. Stat presented two unique issues: (1) whether it was prop-
er to authorize courtroom security personnel to use prophylactic apparel
while escorting a defendant merely suspected of having acquired im-
munodeficiency syndrome (AIDS),10 and (2) the extent to which this han-
dling procedure impacted the jury. This Note will analyze the Wiggins
decision, emphasizing the court's reasoning as it pertains to the follow-
ing: (1) the guarantee of a fair and impartial jury trial for defendants
either having or being suspected of having AIDS; (2) the permissible ex-
ercise of discretion by the trial judge in authorizing precautions during
the course of the trial; and (3) harmless error and judicial review.
FACTS
In Wiggins v. State," a Maryland jury convicted Bernard Wiggins for
the murder and robbery of Bjorn Haug.2 The evidence at trial indicated
that Wiggins, his two roommates and Haug were homosexuals.' A post-
mortem medical examination revealed that Haug was AIDS infected.'
The undisputed evidence also indicated that one of Wiggins' roommates
carried the HIV virusP At the trial and in the presence of the jury, sheriff's
deputies prominently wore rubber gloves as they escorted Wiggins into
the courtroom.6 The judge called a bench conference and informed counsel
that he had authorized the procedure as a precaution to the "possibility
or probability" that Wiggins had AIDS." Expressing concern for the safety
of the jury, the judge further ordered that the exhibits were not to be han-
dled by the jurors.
Wiggins objected to the precautions because the court had no medical
evidence to indicate that Wiggins either had, or carried, the AIDS virus.P
The judge overruled the objection?0 On the trial's second day deputies
' 315 Md. 232, 554 A.2d 356.
10 Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome is a disease that is characterized by a breakdown of
the human immune system and an inability of the body to fight infections. The virus which causes
AIDS is known as the human immunodeficiency virus (H1V). H1V is the same virus which has been
referred to as HTLV-II (human T-lymphotropic virus, type II) and LAV (lymphadenopathy associated-
virus). HIV is the virus, AIDS is the disease. See Stauter, United States u Moore: AIDS and the
Criminal Law-The Witch Hunt Begins, 22 AKRON L. REV. 503,504 (1989); Mortimer, The Virus and
the Tests, 294 Brit. Med. J. 1602, 1602 (1987); and note 115, infra.
1 315 Md. 232, 554 A.2d 356.
12 Id. at 232, 554 A.2d at 356.
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wearing rubber gloves again escorted Wiggins into the courtroom, but
the jury had not yet been seated?1 However, the deputies, still wearing
the gloves, remained seated behind Wiggins?2 Again, Wiggins objected
on grounds that the jury might draw inferences regarding his physical
condition, and that these inferences, together with the jurors' beliefs and
stereotypes, might adversely affect Wiggins' right to a fair trial?' The
judge overruled the objection?4 Subsequently, the jury returned a guilty
verdict?5 Wiggins appealed
6
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals stated that wearing gloves
was completely inconsistent with current theories concerning the spread
of AIDS?7 Consequently, the trial judge erred in the exercise of his discre-
tion?" However, there was no evidence in the record to indicate that the
use of gloves prejudicially affected Wiggins' right to a fair trial?9 During
voir dire, the judge asked the jury whether this case, which had "touches
of homosexuality," would prejudice the fairness of their decisions?' Because
the jurors indicated an ability to remain impartial,31 the Court of Special
Appeals reasoned that the voir dire question sufficiently removed the
possibility of jurors prejudicially associating AIDS with homosexuality.?2




While the sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right




" Id. at 237, 554 A.2d at 359.
25 Id. at 232, 554 A.2d at 356.
2 Id. at 237-38, 554 A.2d at 358-59.
" Wiggins v. State, 76 Md. App. 188, 198, 544 A.2d 8, 13 (1988); a discussion as to the current
medical theories regarding the transmission of AIDS is discussed in note 115, infra.
" Wiggins, 76 Md. App. at 199, 544 A.2d at 13-14.
20 Id. at 199-200, 544 A.2d at 13-14.
" Id. at 199, 544 A.2d at 14.
31 Id.
32 Id.
" Wiggins, 315 Md. 232,554 A.2d 356. The Maryland Court of Appeals stated that the voir dire
questioning was insufficient to remove any potentially impermissible inferences that the jury may
have drawn from the precautions. Whether a person can remain neutral regarding homosexuality
is a far cry from presuming equivalent attitudes regarding AIDS Moreover, it was unreasonable
to assume that the jurors were so unsophisticated that, upon seeing the precautions taken in the
courtroom, "they did not know of the existence of AIDS and the dire consequences of the disease.'
' See note 1, supra.
RECEIVNG A FAIR TRIALFall, 1989]
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matter of due process, the trial must be fair. 5 The presumption of in-
nocence is a legal maxim used to facilitate the fairness of a trial by plac-
ing the burden of proof on the states and ensuring that the defendant
is granted the indicia of innocence necessary for a fair trial 7 This
presumption has existed throughout history.s The presumption has been
referred to as "the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its en-
forcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal
law.' 9 In its basic form, the presumption requires that the accused is
entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of
the evidence properly introduced at trial40 Official suspicion, indictment,
continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial
violate the presumption by frustrating its basic purpose. 1
Prejudicial Courtroom Practices
Generally, the use of physical restraints to prevent escape, to prevent
possible violence to the spectators and court officials, and to prevent
disruption, have been held to lie within the sound discretion of the trial
judge. 2 Therefore, when the trial judge's exercise of discretion is at issue
on appeal, the reviewing court will not disturb the exercise of discretion
unless the trial judge clearly abused it.3 Judges must use reason, prin-
ciple, and common sense as a guide in evaluating the probable effects
of particular courtroom procedures" to ensure that the procedures do not
threaten the fairness of the fact-finding process. 5
Occasionally, a courtroom procedure impacts the jury to such an ex-
tent that it prejudices the accused. 6 However, the actual impact of the
procedure on the judgment of jurors cannot always be discovere& 7 The
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part that
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ."
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The United States Supreme Court in In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
136 (1955) stated that "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process [guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution]." In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965),
the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment makes the guarantees of the sixth amend-
ment obligatory upon the states.
36 See generally Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453-60 (1895), which traces the presump-
tion of innocence to the early Nineteenth century laws of Sparta, Athens and Rome.
" Krauskopf, Physical Restraint of the Defendant in the Q7ourtroom, 15 ST. Louis U.L.J. 351, 355
(1971).
38 Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453-60.
19 Id. at 453.
4' Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S 478, 485 (1978).
41 Id.
42 Note, Guidelines for Controlling the Disruptive Defendant, 56 MIN. L. REV. 699, 703 (1972).
4 Esterline v. State, 105 Md. 629, 637, 66 A. 269, 272 (1907).
" Estelle, 425 U.S 501, 503-04.
45 Id. at 504.
46 Id.
47 Id.
AKRON LAW REVIEW (VOL. 23:2
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standard of review is "close judicial scrutiny" if there is a probability
of deleterious effects on the defendant's right to an impartial trial 8 In
Holbrook v. Flynn,49 the Supreme Court stated that when a criminal de-
fendant's due process is inherently denied due to a procedure that in-
volves the probability of prejudice, "the question must not be whether
jurors actually articulate a consciousness of some prejudicial effect, but
rather whether an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible fac-
tors coming into play.""°
In Holbrook,51 The State of Rhode Island charged Charles Flynn and
his five co-defendants with armed robbery. 2 The trial court, ordered the
State Adult Correctional Institution to hold Flynn and his five co-
defendants without bail 3 During the trial, four uniformed, armed state
troopers sat in the front row of the spectator's area of the courtroom for
the purpose of supplementing the court's normal security.5' After Flynn
objected to the procedure, the judge ordered a hearing 5 Flynn argued
that while he would not object to the presence of plain clothed security
officers, the presence of uniformed officers would suggest to the jury that
the defendants were of "bad character."
56
The trial judge considered the following facts: (1) the number of of-
ficers in the building was insufficient to meet the preferred ratio of two
officers to every defendant; and (2) of the 54 prospective jurors who had
not been struck before they were asked about the troopers, 51 stated that
the troopers' presence would not create an inference of the defendant's
guilt in their mind.57 The Court held that in authorizing the presence
of the troopers, the trial judge did not deny the guarantee of a fair trial .58
The Court stated that it could not find an unacceptable risk of prejudice
from the four officers quietly sitting in the courtroom when such a pro-
cedure is not inherently prejudicial and when the defendant fails to show
actual prejudice. 9
48 Id See also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), and In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
49 475 U.S. 560 (1986).
" Id. at 570.
5' 475 U.S. 560.
52 Id. at 562.
53 Id.
54Id.
"- Id. at 563-65.
" Id. at 563.
"
7 Id. at 564-65. In Flynn v. Holbrook, 749 F.2d 961, 964 (1st Cir. 1984), rev'd, 475 U.S. 560 (1986),
the U.S. Court of Appeals stated that the trial judge acted prematurely under the circumstances
in that the defendants did not threaten the safety of courtroom officials or spectators. The court
further believed that the judge "simply indicated a fear that since the defendants had not been
bailed, they might flee from the courtroom"
" Id. at 567-72. The Court further stated that conspicuous deployment of security personnel
in a court during the trial is not an inherently prejudicial practice comparable to shackling.
"- Id. at 572.
RECEWING A FAmR TRLALFall, 1989]
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Physical Restraint Procedures
Typical courtroom practices posing threats to the fairness of the fact-
finding process generally involve controlling or restraining the defendant.
Shackling defendants in the jury's presence is greatly prejudicial to a
fair trial because it introduces "extraneous indicia of guilt into the minds
of presumably impartial jurors."' In Bowers v. State,2 a jury convicted
the defendant of first degree murder 3 During the sentencing phase of
the trial, the judge polled the jury to determine whether they would draw
any adverse inferences about the defendant from seeing him in leg irons
On appeal, the court believed that the procedure did not prejudice the
defendant 5 Relevant factors justifying the trial judge's action include
the fact that the defendant's conviction survived appellate review, that
the defendant had previous institutional difficulties, and that the defen-
dant had personality problemsf 6
In Illinois v. Allen,7 a jury convicted the defendant of armed robbery.8
The defendant conducted his defense pro se 9 Throughout the trial, the
defendant was upset and argued with the judge in a very abusive and
disrespectful manner.7 The judge ordered the defendant removed from
the court, and proceeded with appointed counsel!' The Supreme Court
approved the trial judge's actions and stated that "trial judges confronted
with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be
given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case" '72
However, gagging and shackling should be used as a last resort!3 It was
not only possible that "the sight of shackles and gags might have a signifi-
cant effect on the jury's feelings about the defendant, but the use of this
technique is itself something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum
of judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold' 74
Note, Dealing with Unruly Persons in the Courtroom, 48 N.C.L. REV. 878, 879 (1970).
61 Id.
62 306 Md. 120, 507 A.2d 1072 (1986).
6 Id. at 122, 507 A.2d at 1073.
Id. at 126, 507 A.2d at 1075.
6 Id. at 138-39, 507 A.2d at 1081.
Id.
67 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
66 Id. at 338-39.
9Id. The defendant conducted his defense in his own behalf.
7o Id. at 339-40. During voir dire, the defendant threatened the judge, stating "[wihen I go out
for lunchtime, you're [the judge] going to be a corpse here.' Also, the defendant threatened to disrupt
the trial stating that "[tihere's not going to be no trial, either" regardless of whether the judge ordered
gagging, shackles or any other type of restraint.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 343.




Akron Law Review, Vol. 23 [1990], Iss. 2, Art. 11
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol23/iss2/11
RECEIVING A FAIR TRIAL
In Dixon v. State,75 the defendant was led into and removed from the
courtroom wearing handcuffs while the jury was present. 6 The jury con-
victed the defendant. 7 On appeal, the defendant argued that the hand-
cuff procedure denied him a fair trial7s The appeals court upheld the trial
judge's actions, stating that the circumstances surrounding the case
justified the physical restraint in order to protect those present in the
courtroom?9 Important factors in the judge's decision were that the de-
fendant threatened to harm the deputies, and that the city jail person-
nel were on strike!0 Other justifications for physical restraints may be
founded upon the defendant's tendency toward violence; the seriousness
of the charge; the defendant's physical/mental temperament; the defend-
ant's prior record; and past or present escapes'
While physical restraints may be necessary to ensure safety and order,
the Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that requiring a defendant
to wear prison garb clearly furthers no "essential state policy."' 2 Moreover,
the prison garb is a constant reminder of the defendant's condition, and
such a distinctive outfit may affect a juror's judgment!' It has been sug-
gested that defendants who wear prison garb or who are accompanied
by guards are more likely to be found guilty than unsupervised defend-
ants wearing their own clothes!4
The Harmless Error Rule
Although the conduct of a criminal trial is committed to the trial
judge's sound discretion, s the defendant's right to a fair trial is paramount
and is protected by the Constitution.8 In Chapman v. California,8 7 the
Supreme Court laid down the test to be applied in cases involving an
alleged constitutional error.8 The Court stated that "before a federal
" 27 Md. App. 443, 340 A.2d 396 (1975).
" Id. at 451, 340 A.2d at 401.
7 Id. at 443, 340 A.2d at 396.
78 Id. at 451, 340 A.2d at 401.
79 Id.
so Id.
" See People v. Whitson, 127 Ill. App.3d 999, 470 N.E.2d 1054 (1984).
" Estelle, 425 U.S at 505. The Court also stated that forcing the defendant to wear jail garb
may violate fourteenth amendment equal protection guarantees because the requirement usually
operated against those who could not post bail prior to trial, while those who could secure release
were not subjected to the requirement. Id. at 505-06.
"3 Id. at 505.
", Fontaine & Kigler, The Effects of Defendant Dress and Supervision on Judgments of Simulated
Jurors: An Exploratory Study, 2 LAW AND HuMAN BEHAVIOR 63, 69-70 (1978). However, the social
science study further explains that favored treatment was accorded defendants who had both super-
vision and prison clothing.
85 Smith v. State, 299 Md. 158, 179, 472 A.2d 988 (1984).
Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503.
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constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare
a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."8 9 The harmless
error rule is an "outcome-oriented" rule?° For instance, errors having no
impact on the outcome of the judicial proceedings may not be harmful?1
If the appellate court determines there was a reasonable probability that,
absent the alleged error, a different result would have been reached, then
the error is harmful?2
ANALYSIS
Wiggins v. State
The trial court's interest in protecting the safety and security of the
trial judge, the jurors, courtroom personnel and spectators during trial93
did not justify the precautions taken in Wiggins. Because the judge never
really knew whether Wiggins was AIDS infected,95 the precautions were,
at minimum, premature?' The Wiggins court held that the trial court
abused its discretion by permitting the guards to wear gloves before the
court determined that the procedure was necessary to promote legitimate
state concerns?7
Initially, the court of appeals stated that while a trial judge has
substantial discretion over the proceedings in a criminal case,95 it is cer-
tainly not unlimited?9 If the judge's exercise of discretion denies a de-
fendant the right to a fair trial, the judge has abused his discretion °00
Consquently, the judgment may be set aside.'°' When the trial judge's ex-
ercise of discretion is at issue on appeal, the trial record should state
" Id. at 24. In Dorsey v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals stated that "there is no sound
reason for drawing a distinction between the treatment of those errors which are of constitutional
dimension and those other evidentiary, or procedural, errors which may have been committed dur-
ing a trial .... Invariably, a number of constitutional rights, be they of federal or state origin, are
inexorably intertwined with state rules of evidence and procedure." 276 Md. 638, 657-58, 350 A.2d
665,677 (1976). In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Murphy stated that the Chapman harmless-
error rule only applies to violations of constitutional rights and that a less exacting rule should
apply for non-constitutional rights.
Stacy & Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79,82-85 (1988).
9' Id. at 85.
92 Id.
' Note, supra note 42, at 703.
Wiggins, 315 Md. 232, 554 A.2d 356.
Id. at 236, 554 A.2d at 358.
Id. at 240, 554 A.2d at 360.
Id. at 232, 554 A.2d at 366.
"Id. at 239, 554 A.2d at 359.
"Id.
100 Id. at 239-40, 554 A.2d at 359.
101 Id.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [VOL. 23:2
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the judge's justifications for the action 02 In Bowers v. State03 the court
stated that it preferred that the basis for the judge's action be explicitly
stated" ° The general rule is to affirm the exercise of discretion when
it is clear from the record that there were good and sufficient reasons
to support the judge's action.'°s
Rather than attempting to ascertain Wiggins' true physical condi-
tion, the trial judge made a factual conclusion based on the evidence.!°"
The evidence showed that both Haug and Wiggins' roommate either had
AIDS or carried the HIV virus.07 Haug allegedly met Wiggins for pur-
poses of homosexual relations.0 8 Therefore, the trial judge concluded that
Wiggins had the disease 09 When the judge authorized deputies to use
the rubber gloves, he did not inform the jury of the reason for the use 10
In effect, the judge introduced an "unexplained factor irrelevant and ex-
traneous to the issue of Wiggins' guilt or innocence "'11'
The court of appeals emphasized that "[it is not a big step in logical
inference, considering the contemporary climate, from seeing the guards
protected in their contact with the defendant to the thought that he might
have AIDS," and it was "not far fetched that the jury, observing the gloves,
thought it better, in any event, that Wiggins be withdrawn from public
circulation and confined in an institution with others of his ilk" 12 Ac-
cording to the court of appeals, the trial judge should have requested a
medical determination on whether Wiggins was infected with the
disease."3 The court then should have placed on record the prevailing
medical opinion regarding the propriety of the guards using gloves as
a precautionary measure."4
The current medical theories regarding the spread of AIDS"
15
Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 507 A.2d 1072.
103 Id.
I" Id. at 138, 507 A.2d at 1081. See also Dixon v. State, 27 Md. App. 443, 450-52, 340 A.2d 396,
401-02 (1975).
105 Id.




"0 Id. at 245, 554 A.2d at 362.
... Id. at 244, 554 A.2d at 362.
112 Id. at 244-45, 554 A.2d at 362.
110 Id. at 245 n.5, 554 A.2d at 362 n.5.
114 Id.
"I U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES, THE SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED
IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 5 (1986) states that:
Aids is not spread by common everyday contact but by sexual contact (penis-vagina,
penis-rectum, mouth-rectum, mouth-vagina, mouth-penis). Yet there is great mis-
understanding resulting in unfounded fear that AIDS can be spread by casual, non-
sexual contact. The first cases of AIDS were reported in this country in 1981. We would
RECEIVING A FAIR TRiALFall, 1989]
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support the conclusion that the use of gloves was an improper action"6
Moreover, because the glove precaution may have contributed to the ren-
dition of the guilty verdict, the court of appeals could not declare beyond
a reasonable doubt1 7 that Wiggins received a fair and impartial trial.1
Extension of the Physical Restraint Cases
The Wiggins decision evidences an extension of the physical restraint
cases. The recurring theme in Bowers," 9 Allen,120 Dixon and Holbrook"22
involved the concern that the fact-finder would either consciously or un-
consciously attribute guilt to the defendant by virtue of seeing the de-
fendant physically restrained or removed from the courtroom. 2" Because
the trial courts had determined that shackling, gagging or physical
removal were necessary to further legitimate state concerns, the courts
were justified in imposing the more extreme courtroom procedures 24
The fact-finder's purpose is to weigh the probative evidence offered
throughout the trial and render a judgment thereon.2 In criminal trials,
the jury should infer a defendant's guilt based solely on the properly ad-
mitted evidence. 26 In the physical restraint cases, the defendants were
concerned that, in observing the shackles or handcuffs, the jury would
invariably infer guilt upon seeing the defendant physically bound! 27 In
know by now if AIDS were passed by casual, non-sexual contact.
In In Re Peacock, 59 Bankr. 568 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986), the court was presented with a bankrupt
afflicted with "pre-AIDS syndrome," and in determining whether any special precautions should
be implemented, the Court deferred to the judgment of a medical epidemiologist with the Center
for Disease Control. The substance of the advisement stated that:
The cause of the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) has been found to be
a virus known as human T-lymphotropic virus, type m or lymphadenopathy associated
virus (HTLV-III/LAV). HTLV-IIIILAV can be transmitted through sexual contact or
through blood products or blood. We have no evidence that it can be transmitted through
air, food, water, inanimate objects, or casual contact.
We have not recommended special precautions for courtroom proceedings where one
or more of the participants has AIDS. I know of no usual courtroom procedure that
would result in transmission of HTLV-III/LAV. Peacock, 59 Bankr. at 571.
116 Wiggins, 315 Md. at 244, 554 A.2d at 361-62.
117 Id., 554 A.2d at 362.
118 Id. at 253, 554 A.2d at 366.
110 Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 507 A.2d 1072 (1986).
120 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
121 Dixon v. State, 27 Md. App. 443, 340 A.2d 396 (1975).
122 Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986).
12 See generally, Bowers, 306 Md. 120, 507 A.2d 1072; Allen, 397 U.S. 337; Dixon, 27 Md. App.
443, 340 A.2d 396 (1975); and Holbrook, 475 U.S. 560.
124 Id.
"I See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (defendant has the right to have the jury consider only
evidence adduced at trial).
12 See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (the court must secure the concept that guilt is to be
found only on the basis of probative evidence).
... See generally Note, supra note 60, at 879.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [VOL. 23:2
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effect, the jury would not be basing its conviction on probative evidence,
but upon reliance of a distortive physical restraint procedure.P28 Wiggins
is distinguishable from these cases.
Wiggins argued that the prejudicial inference in his case was based
upon the glove precaution.2 9 Specifically, because the jury observed Wig-
gins being escorted by guards wearing gloves, it was reasonable to infer
that he was infected with a disease.3 ° Moreover, because the case involved
homosexual behavior, it was also reasonable for the jury to infer that Wig-
gins had AIDS.31 This inference chain is similar to the ones challenged
when gags and shackles were used.
The use of gloves, like the use of gags or shackles, introduced a poten-
tially prejudicial element before the jury.P32 These dramatic and distor-
tive elements were clearly irrelevant to the issue of the defendant's guilt
or innocence.1 3 From a presumably impartial jury's view, the introduc-
tion of these elements is not only certain to impact the defendant's
presumption of innocence3" but in Wiggins, it was also possible that the
jury would infer that Wiggins had AIDS.3 5 This inference chain is im-
permissible because it effectually counteracts the principle that only pro-
bative evidence is to influence the jury. 36
Additionally, medical authorities have unequivocally stated that
transmission of the AIDS virus is extremely limited,3 7 and unlikely to
occur in the courtroom setting.38 Therefore, the trial court's precaution
was not reasonably tailored to fulfilling the alleged state concern. 3 9 In
In re Peacock,"' the court was faced with a debtor diagnosed as a victim
of pre-AIDS syndrome' 4' The court inquired into the propriety of using
face masks as a special procedure for protecting the litigants, witnesses
and court personnel from possible infection by the debtor. 42 The court
128 Id.
Wiggins v. State, 315 Md. at 236-37, 554 A.2d at 358.
130 Id. at 244-45, 554 A.2d at 361.
Id., 554 A.2d at 361-62.
112 Id. at 240 n.4, 554 A.2d at 360 n.4.
... Id. at 244-45, 554 A.2d at 362.
34 See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. at 570.
135 Wiggins, 315 Md. at 244-45, 554 A.2d at 362.
136 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
131 See note 115, supra.
131 Id See also In re Peacock, 59 Bankr. 568.
131 Wiggins v. State, 315 Md. at 236, 554 A.2d at 358. The concern of the Maryland trial court
was the safety of the sheriffs deputies.
140 59 Bankr. 568.
4 Id. at 569. Although the court uses the phrase "pre-AIDS syndrome," for purposes of address-
ing the prophylactic issue, the court equated pre-AIDS syndrome to full-blown AIDS
142 Id.
Fall, 1989] RECEIVING A FAiR TRiAL
11
Zamora: Receiving a Fair Trial
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1990
determined that the procedure was unnecessary. 4 The bankruptcy judge
was primarily convinced by a letter from an epidemiologist with the
Center for Disease Control which stated that no evidence existed to sug-
gest that AIDS may be transmitted "through air, food, water, inanimate
objects, or casual contact."'"
Just as the Peacock court declined to impose special precautions as
a means of promoting health and safety, at minimum, the Wiggins trial
court should have conducted an investigative hearing on the matter.45
Also, the Maryland court of appeals would have had an adequate record
to evaluate the judge's exercise of discretion.'46 This is important, because
if the prevailing medical testimony suggested that the precautions were
necessary, the court of appeals may not have found an abuse of discre-
tion.!47
The Chapman "Harmless Error" Rule
Wiggins challenged the use of gloves as a procedure likely to cause
the jury to form prejudicial inferences.4 s Thus, the appeals court had to
determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion in using the pro-
cedure. According to Chapman v. California49 and Dorsey v. State,50 the
applicable test is whether the appellate court can "declare a belief that
[the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."'15 In other words,
the reviewing court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable possibili-
ty that the evidence or procedure complained of may have contributed
to the rendition of the guilty verdict.!5"
The harmless error rule is based on the underlying policy of shielding
jurors from matters upon which no evidence is offered and which are likely
to influence the jury.!53 Behavior which violates the rules regulating pro-
secutorial and judicial conduct at trial often gives rise to the creation
of unfavorable inferences regarding the defendant's guilt. 54
143 Id. at 569.
'" Id. at 571. See also note 115, supra.
145 Wiggins v. State, 315 Md. at 245 n.5, 554 A.2d at 362 n.5.
146 Id.
1 Id. at 240 n.4, 554 A.2d at 360 n.4.
1 Id. at 240-45, 554 A.2d at 360-62.
149 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
"5 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976).
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
112 Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. at 659, 350 A.2d at 678.
153 Note, Harmless Error: Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct, 74 J. CaiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 457,
463 (1983).
'" Id. at 463.
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The Wiggins court considered the climate surrounding the AIDS issue
and the popular beliefs regarding its transmission. 55 The court then held
that it was probable that seeing Wiggins escorted by deputies wearing
gloves would lead the jury to infer he was infected with AIDS. 6 Because
the jury was not instructed as to the medically recognized methods of
AIDS transmission, it is very probable that they may have used their
own information and experience to conclude it was better to remove the
defendant from society.57 For this reason, the Wiggins court believed that
it could not declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the gloves did not
prejudice the defendant.58 Wiggins appears to have applied the harmless
error test consistently with the rule enunciated in Chapman and Dorsey.
If counsel had asked the jurors during voir dire whether the use of
gloves would prejudice their ability to render an impartial verdict, the
question of fairness may have been rendered moot. Where the jurors have
demonstrated an ability to remain impartial regarding the shackling of
a contumacious defendant, the court has permitted a conviction to stand: 5
Yet, because the trial judge's purpose of using gloves was entirely incon-
sistent with theories regarding AIDS transmission, and was completely
ineffective as a safety precaution, the conviction could not stand in view
of the prejudicial impact to the jury.
CONCLUSION
Public concern and fear of AIDS have certainly contributed to the
current level of heightened awareness among the American population
concerning AIDS. Moreover, because of the rapid spread and currently
uncurable nature of the disease, the influx of AIDS-infected individuals
,' Wiggins v. State, 315 Md. at 240-45, 554 A.2d 360-62.
" Id. The court reviewed various current periodicals that tended to demonstrate widespread
public concern and fear of AIDS. Because of the precautions, "it is not improbable that the jury
would assume, in light of the widespread and continuous publicity devoted to AIDS, that Wiggins
was infected with the disease." Id. at 244, 554 A.2d at 361. Because of this, there was a reasonable
possibility that the precautions "may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdicts' Id.
at 244, 554 A.2d at 362.
157 Id. at 244-45, 554 A.2d at 362.
1 Id. at 244, 554 A.2d at 362.
1 See Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 507 A.2d 1072; Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337. In Holbrook
v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, the Court stated that while the jurors may be questioned at the beginning
of a trial as to their attitudes regarding a procedure, "at that point, they can only speculate on how
they will feel after being exposed to a practice daily over the course of a long trial.' Id. at 570. Thus,
attitudes may change to the defendant's detriment.
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into the American criminal justice system will present continuing issues
for the legal community. Wiggins provided an answer to the narrow issue
of a trial's fairness when it held that the constitutional guarantee of a
fair and impartial trial should not be frustrated by incorrect assumptions
regarding the transmission of AIDS. In the courtroom, a criminal defen-
dant having the disease must be treated the same as an uninfected defen-
dant. In conclusion, because Wiggins considered usage of the glove precau-
tion an unnecessary and prejudicial procedure, Wiggins evidences an ex-
tension and preservation of basic and fundamental rights afforded defen-
dants in criminal trials, irrespective of whether such individuals are in-
fected with the dreaded disease AIDS.
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